The inter-connected challenges for food security from a food regimes perspective: Energy, climate and malconsumption by Sage, Colin
Title The inter-connected challenges for food security from a food regimes
perspective: Energy, climate and malconsumption
Author(s) Sage, Colin
Publication date 2013-01
Original citation Sage, C (2013) 'The inter-connected challenges for food security from a
food regimes perspective: Energy, climate and malconsumption'.
Journal of Rural Studies, 29 (1):71-80. doi:
10.1016/j.jrurstud.2012.02.005
Type of publication Article (peer-reviewed)
Link to publisher's
version
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0743016712000460
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rurstud.2012.005
Access to the full text of the published version may require a
subscription.
Rights Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. NOTICE: this is
the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in
Journal of Rural Studies. Changes resulting from the publishing
process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural
formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be
reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this
work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was
subsequently published in Journal of Rural Studies, [Volume 29,
January 2013, Pages 71–80] DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2012.02.005
Item downloaded
from
http://hdl.handle.net/10468/1311
Downloaded on 2017-02-12T06:40:56Z
1 
 
The inter-connected challenges for food security from a food regimes 
perspective: Energy, climate and malconsumption. 
 
Colin Sage 
 
Published in Journal of Rural Studies 29, 1: 71-80 (2013) 
 
1. Introduction 
Growing food price volatility during the first decade of the twenty-first century has 
certainly elicited attention from mainstream science and policy analysis (FAO 2009, 
Royal Society 2009, Science 2010, UK Government Office for Science 2011, 
Economist 2011). While some documents remain “cautiously optimistic”, that 
commodity prices will fall from their 2010-11 levels and stabilise as market signals 
incentivise farmers to produce more food (OECD-FAO 2011), most are less 
sanguine about the prospects for feeding the world, especially a global population of 
9b by 2050 (Evans 2009). Indeed, of these recent mainstream reports, there are 
varying degrees of acknowledgement of the other challenges that intersect with food 
production - such as projected rates of global warming, freshwater depletion, 
biodiversity losses, and tightening energy markets - let alone matters of livelihood 
security and improved access to food for the rural poor. For most, the central 
solution is to develop and apply new agricultural technologies in order to increase 
food production. Only one recent report of international significance comes to a 
different conclusion: the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, 
Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD 2009), was clear in its advocacy 
for a new direction in public policy for food and livelihood security under increasingly 
constrained environmental conditions. As the IAASTD Synthesis Report states: “the 
current agricultural knowledge, science and technology model requires revision. 
Business as usual is no longer an option” (IAASTD 2009: 3).    
Yet, developing more sustainable forms of agricultural production that build on the 
agro-ecological knowledge of small-holder farmers has so far received only limited 
support from national and international institutions and policies (Pretty et al. 2010, 
Lang et al 2009). Not least there remains a hugely powerful status quo that regards 
the current crisis as requiring the rejuvenation of the existing agri-industrial model. 
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Framing the debate in quasi-Malthusian terms as the need to ‘double’ food 
production by 2050 to feed a global population of nine billion1
 
, the ‘new productivism’ 
is a call for a renewed effort to intensify production (Horlings and Marsden 2011). It 
may be that precision agriculture, next generation genetic engineering and 
nanotechnology (Beddington 2010, Tester and Langridge 2010, Gebbers and 
Adamchuk 2010, Scrinis and Lyons 2010) all potentially have a role to play in the 
future development of the food system; and, as the Foresight report tells us, should 
not be excluded a priori on ethical or moral grounds (UK Government Office for 
Science 2011). Yet some technologies may not be best suited to the needs of many 
users, nor may they necessarily enhance the human right to adequate food (De 
Schutter 2011a). Moreover, the development and extension of property rights and 
patent laws in combination with genetic technologies has resulted in the 
concentration of agricultural biotechnologies in a few corporations (Blakeney 2011) 
and there remains deep suspicion in many quarters about the use of science for 
private gain rather than public good, particularly for something as essential as food. 
Indeed, the privatization and commoditization of the “basic building blocks of life” 
(Schurman and Munro 2011) raise profound ethical questions that cannot only be 
regarded a posteriori.   
The global food system today comprises a great deal more than the cultivation of 
primary foods, whether transgenic or organic. As Lang (2010: 88) observes, “power 
and capital have moved off the land” with the entire relationship between people, 
food systems and the planet now restructured. This has enabled the major food 
processing industries, trading companies and supermarket chains – regarded by van 
der Ploeg as de facto ‘food empires’ - to exert a ‘monopolistic power over the entire 
food supply chain’ (van der Ploeg 2010, see also 2008). Understandably, this has 
had a huge bearing on farming systems, as they are reshaped by speculative 
external forces seeking to exploit specific local circumstances to produce high value 
goods for distant markets. This inevitably has huge repercussions for ecosystems in 
which that farming occurs, for farmers and workers, as well as for the quality of the 
food it produces. It also creates the conditions for greater vulnerability to external 
shocks, whether climatic perturbation or market prices.  
                                                            
1 Statement made by Jacques Diouf, Director-General of FAO at the high level conference on world 
food security, Rome, June 2008. 
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The events of 2007-08 and again more recently are evidence that the global food 
system is becoming more, not less, vulnerable to external forces. Amongst those 
that have been identified as being the most significant drivers of food price volatility 
are: financial speculation; climate change and extreme weather; energy prices and 
the expansion of the biofuels sector; declining grain stocks; a drastic fall in public 
investment in agriculture over two decades; and rising consumer demand, both 
demographic and changing dietary composition. For the World Bank no less than 
three-quarters of the 140 percent increase in its food prices index from 2002 to 2008 
was caused by biofuels and related effects (Evans 2009). On the other hand, Ghosh 
(2010) sifts through the evidence implicating higher oil prices and poor weather 
conditions and makes a strong case for the overwhelmingly destabilising role of 
speculation on the futures markets for food commodities. Finally, work conducted at 
the New England Complex Systems Institute not only quantitatively models the 
dynamic relationship of food prices with financial speculation and ethanol 
conversion, but traces the links between food price volatility and political instability in 
North Africa and the Middle East (Lagi et al 2011; Lagi, Bertrand, Bar-Yam 2011) .    
Such studies not only reveal the complexity of connections between the food supply 
system and a range of other issues, but demonstrate the need for research that can 
develop a trans-disciplinary perspective. This approach needs to draw together two 
divergent challenges.  The first is to better understand the sources of vulnerability of 
the global food system in order to revise thinking about food security. Recent 
experiences of food price volatility demonstrate that the system is highly sensitive to 
short-term episodic shocks: it lacks resilience and a buffering capacity to cope 
effectively with such events. This might be partly mitigated by rebuilding global grain 
stocks and restoring the legitimacy of government interventions to support needy 
populations. But all the evidence suggests that the global food system as it is 
currently organized is unlikely to be able to cope with long-term stress arising from 
climate change. In this regard it becomes a vital task to enhance the adaptive 
capacity of local and regional food systems (Leach et al 2010). Yet such measures 
may constitute little more than band-aids if we do not address the second key 
research challenge: which is to better understand the fundamental dynamics and 
locus of control of the global food system. In this regard we require a framework of 
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analysis that can connect agricultural production and food consumption patterns, 
identify the key vectors of power, and locate them within an evolving economic 
system that is reshaping people’s access to food.   
Without seeking to overstate its explanatory capabilities, this paper draws upon the 
food regimes approach to help highlight some of these issues. While once largely 
known for its historical periodisation of an emerging international food system, a 
focus that arguably brought it to a state of impasse (Burch and Lawrence 2009), it 
has recently re-emerged as offering a suitable framework to help explain 
reconfigurations of the global food system (Pritchard 2009). A food regimes 
approach offers a wider lens not only through which to examine the structural 
shortcomings of the existing food order, but it is also alert to alternative models that 
challenge the ecological and ethical basis of trans-national agri-food supply chains.   
This paper has developed as a review exercise, drawing principally upon scholarly 
articles and documentary sources. A significant amount of material has recently 
been placed in the public domain concerned with global food security in light of 
recent price instability (eg the UK Foresight Studies; see also inter alia:  Royal 
Society 2009, Science 2010, EC 2009, Ambler-Edwards et al 2009). A striking 
feature of much, though by no means all, of this work is its preoccupation with 
feeding a world of nine billion by 2050, with the central axiom the need for scientific 
and technological innovation in agriculture to raise output. This raises three 
important considerations. First, it has been argued that population increase and the 
prospect of hunger assert a powerful ideological claim that overrides questions of 
distribution or the associated ecological costs of production systems (Feldman and 
Biggs 2012). Second, an approach that emphasises agricultural output increasingly 
regards food, feed and fuels as a set of interchangeable and tradable commodities 
for international markets rather than constituting the elements for national food 
security. Indeed, biofuels production designed to enhance energy security in distant 
countries may well stake a superior claim to land than the cultivation of food staples 
to alleviate domestic hunger. Third, a concern with food output is not concerned with 
matters of diet or of nutritional security: it assumes the continued global projection of 
western dietary norms through the process of ‘nutrition transition’ (Popkin 2005).  
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It is in light of these considerations that this paper seeks critically to examine three 
key areas of vulnerability in the prevailing food system that at once reveals its 
asymmetrical balance of power. First, the paper will review some of the implications 
for agriculture emerging from the rising cost of fossil fuels. In the ‘peak of the oil age’ 
(Aleklett et al 2010) biofuels have come to serve as a surrogate source of automotive 
energy, resulting in the diversion of coarse grains, sugar cane and vegetable oils 
from food processing into petro-chemical refineries. Indeed, such is the extent to 
which agri-commodity traders and governments are locked in mutual pursuit of 
energy security – swathed, it should be said, in the greenwash of ‘carbon neutrality’ - 
that it has triggered a host of speculative land deals in the poorest countries (van der 
Horst and Vermeylen 2011). Secondly, although it has been recognised that climate 
change threatens agricultural productivity in the poorest countries (Gregory et al 
2005), recent scenario building exercises reveal just how dramatically warming and 
drying will exacerbate food insecurity in many regions throughout the tropics. Thirdly, 
a focus on the global food system rather than simply upon agriculture requires 
attention to the ‘nutrition transition’, whereby diets traditionally dominated by regional 
staples are replaced by highly processed products high in fats, salt and sweeteners. 
This process is being driven by the worldwide expansion of powerful agri-food 
corporations that are engaged in the aggressive marketing of branded goods and 
retail services, particularly within newly emerging markets of the South. Thus, 
evaluating the extent of food insecurity requires an understanding of the 
phenomenon of malconsumption, together with its attendant dietary health problems.   
Each of these three sources of vulnerability reveals the shocking asymmetry that 
characterises the global food system and the challenges that lie ahead in addressing 
them. Yet it is not sufficient to make normative statements about the need for new 
policy responses that recognise the importance of building greater resilience in an 
era of risk and uncertainty, or of encouraging people to eat more healthily. Rather, it 
is vital to understand the economic and political processes and structures that give 
rise to hunger and malconsumption on the one hand with the appropriation, depletion 
and degradation of ecosystem services and resources on the other. Food regime 
analysis offers a lens through which to embark upon such a critique.     
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2. Food regimes and food security 
Food regime analysis combines political economy, political ecology and historical 
analysis to explain how particular relations of food production and consumption are 
central to the functioning and reproduction of global capitalism (Holt Gimenéz and 
Shattuck 2011). It is an approach which is less concerned with food as object than 
with the multiple interconnections and relations to which food commodities give rise 
including social, cultural and ecological consequences (McMichael 2009a).  Food 
regimes were once largely known for their historical periodisation of an emerging 
international food system, with the first (1870-1914) and second (1947-1973) food 
regimes interspersed with an ‘experimental and chaotic era (1914-47)’ (Friedmann 
2009). While the period from 1973 to the present has been generally regarded as yet 
another contested and experimental era, some theorists have argued that this has 
begun to constitute a ‘third’ regime with cause to label it as a ‘corporate food regime’ 
(McMichael 2005, Holt Gimenéz and Shattuck 2011, Burch and Lawrence 2009)2
It is as well to remind ourselves that 1973, while marking the end of the second food 
regime, was the year of the first successful cartel-driven increase in oil prices. This 
set in motion a lending and debt spiral as banks recycled petro-dollars to non-oil 
exporting developing countries that led in short order to the Latin American debt 
crisis of the early 1980s (George 1992). The political and institutional alignments 
which then began to take shape at this time (the emerging ‘Washington consensus’) 
were best illustrated by the IMF-World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes 
imposed on countries of the South (Weiss 2007). These public policy tools effectively 
cleared the way for corporate penetration of key economic sectors in the South 
through privatization of state assets; the dismantling of national agencies such as 
crop marketing boards and agricultural extension services; and the elimination of 
. 
Such debates are not of concern here. Rather, the purpose is to utilise a food 
regimes perspective in order to facilitate a more complex understanding of the 
shifting locus of power within the global food system. No claims are made as regards 
the universal and exclusive explanatory capabilities of the food regimes approach: it 
is simply an extremely useful tool for bringing together diverse perspectives and 
dynamics (Campbell and Dixon 2009). 
                                                            
2 McMichael( 2009a) helpfully traces the evolution of food regime analysis and reviews some of the 
recent lines of enquiry which this approach has fostered. 
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social and production supports (subsidies and price guarantees). The establishment 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its raft of agreements on trade related 
measures affecting agriculture effectively “institutionalized the process of agricultural 
liberalization on a global scale by restricting the rights of sovereign states to regulate 
food and agriculture” (Holt Gimenéz and Shattuck 2011: 111). 
 
Corporate power is an undeniable feature of the contemporary food system, with 
private capital moving across borders and throughout the food chain to establish a 
truly global operation. It is also clear that most of the financial capital that now 
controls the global food system is no longer located in primary production. For Lang 
(2010) power now resides with retailers who shape what and how things are grown, 
processed and sold, with sourcing having shifted from the local and national to the 
continental and international (see also Vorley 2003). Others identify the global grain 
and agri-chemical companies that, in their respective sectors exercise very high 
degrees of market concentration (Holt Gimenéz and Shattuck 2011; Hendrickson 
and Heffernan 2007). While van der Ploeg applies the term ‘food empires’ to refer to 
the large processing industries, trading companies, and supermarket chains that 
“increasingly exert a monopolistic power over the entire food supply chain” (2010: 
99).   
 
Under these circumstances it is little wonder that the term ‘corporate food regime’ 
has emerged as a label to define a set of rules institutionalising corporate power in 
the world food system (McMichael 2009a). It has been argued that this new order is 
distinct from the second food regime in part due to the ‘politics of quality’ with the rise 
in audit processes and neo-liberal governance of transnational agri-food supply 
chains (Friedmann and McNair 2008, Friedmann 2005). Such processes now drive a 
host of diverse but inter-related developments within the global food system that 
include: the rise of ‘non-traditional’ exports of high value fruit, vegetables and fish 
from the South; the globalised animal protein chains that stretch from the newly 
planted fields of soybean in the Brazilian cerrado to the intensive pork and poultry 
feeding units around the world; and a supermarket and food service revolution 
through much of the South that is rapidly transforming consumption patterns. The 
analytical value of the food regime approach is that it integrates an understanding of 
food and agriculture within the wider political economy: it locates food within the 
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unfolding of capitalism. Yet it does so while accommodating mid-level analyses 
across the entire food system (from seeds to consumption practices); understanding 
the complex dynamics of production and distribution practices with environment (the 
‘metabolic rift’ ) and by being alert to transnational social movements that challenge 
the existing order and its unjust practices  (McMichael 2009b, Friedmann 2009, 
Campbell and Dixon 2009, Dixon 2009).  
It seems appropriate, then, to draw upon a food regimes approach through which to 
view the vulnerability of the global food system and its propensity to further structural 
failings that are likely to go beyond the experience of food price volatility of 2007-08. 
Such a perspective makes clear that price fluctuations are more than a matter of 
disequilibrium between factors of supply and demand. As the system moves 
inexorably toward the complete commoditization of all factors of production, including 
all resource inputs, established through a uniform world market price – the ultimate 
objective of the neoliberal project - this creates the conditions for the complete 
exchangeability of large agricultural systems in the interests of profitability. Van der 
Ploeg (2010) illustrates this argument with regard to the rise of asparagus farming in 
Peru. Until the late 1990s asparagus was an unknown crop in Peru but in the past 
decade it has become the world’s largest producer earning US$450 m/year. 
Unfortunately, the Ica Valley, where 95 percent of asparagus production is located, is 
also experiencing the fastest rate of aquifer depletion in the world generating huge 
problems for other producers and domestic water users (Lawrence 2010). This 
retailer-driven global supply chain serving Northern consumers - the UK is the third 
largest importer of fresh Peruvian asparagus, consuming 6.5 million kilos a year – 
demonstrates the extent of corporate reach (in association with the World Bank 
which lent the money to develop the scheme) and the mobility of a system which 
even now is moving its focus of operations toward China “where even ‘better’ 
conditions are available” (van der Ploeg 2010: 101).  
If niche production of high-value fresh foods in distant locations for middle-class 
consumers in Northern markets serves as one expression of this new food regime, 
then mass production of standardised goods for global markets might well serve as 
another. Here the capacity of the system to reduce unit costs and drive down food 
prices in order to bring branded ‘Western’ goods into the realm of lower-income 
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urban dwellers in the South has transformed consumption patterns in large parts of 
the world, and here the food service sector might arguably be said to have played 
the harbinger more than food retail. As Lang et al (2009) note, the arrival of foreign 
brands to a developing country can have dramatic effects: creating new 
expectations, widening choice and ‘opening up’ consumers to highly processed, 
energy dense foods. The result is that calorie intakes rise and non-communicable 
diet related diseases follow.  
 
This massification of food production, while it has delivered historically-low prices for 
dietary energy (providing no account is taken of the multiple externalities), does 
reveal the rationale of this contemporary phase of the global food system: the 
engineering (comprising deconstruction, recomposition and combination) of low cost 
primary materials (including synthetic substitutes) into higher value products which 
move rapidly and in large volume through the processing, manufacture, distribution 
and retail branches of the food system. Profitability is contingent upon unit sales: the 
imperative is throughput. Consequently, every incentive exists for consumers to buy 
more than they need or can physiologically metabolise: Morgan Spurlock’s film 
Super Size Me and the supermarket BOGOF promotion (‘buy one get one free’) are 
evidence of this (Sage 2012). Although this results in excessive amounts of food 
waste (Parfitt et al 2010, Stuart 2009) it might also be argued that the system 
encourages consumption of cheap food, with significant consequences for personal 
health and wellbeing. For example, it has been calculated that almost one-fifth of 
food in the US food system comprises ‘luxus consumption’, that is food consumed 
beyond physical need (Blair and Sobal 2006).  A further example of how a food 
regimes lens helps to better understand the role of food and its essential fungibility 
as a commodity to serve principally for profit-seeking, is possibly best demonstrated 
by the conversion of food grains to auto fuel.  
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3. The inter-locking of food and energy security 
In July 2008 the price of a barrel of Brent crude reached an all-time high of $147 and 
for the first time began to demonstrate how rising levels of oil consumption were 
effectively pushed hard up against the prevailing ceiling of production. The 
apparently insatiable demand for fuel to move increasing quantities of food (and 
other goods as well as people) ever-greater distances now began to have an 
immediate consequence in food prices. It also, of course, created significant 
incentives for developing non-conventional sources of oil (eg the Canadian tar 
sands) as well as stimulating biofuels derived from agriculture.  
There is no doubt that the global food system such as it is presently constituted has 
become utterly dependent upon fossil fuels, principally oil and natural gas (Jones 
2001, Pfeiffer 2006, Sage 2012). This dependence stretches from the inputs to 
industrialised agriculture (agro-chemicals and machinery) through food chains that 
circum-navigate the world and rest upon transport fuels for jet engines, heavy goods 
vehicles and the family car making the weekly supermarket shop to the manufacture 
of polymers for packaging. If the widespread substitution of agricultural labour by 
machinery makes farming everywhere more vulnerable to oil price rises, then 
reliance upon chemical fertilisers – particularly urea, the source of synthetic nitrogen 
– reveals the extent to which food and energy have become interlocked. During the 
twentieth century the world’s cultivated area increased by around one-third, though 
with average yields rising four-fold total output increased by almost six times. “This 
gain has been due largely to a more than eightyfold increase of external energy 
inputs, mostly fossil fuels, to crop cultivation” (Smil 2000:4). However, with up to 90 
percent of the cost of urea determined by the price of natural gas, which is used as 
feedstock and process energy, and with natural gas prices tracking oil fairly 
precisely, rising energy costs translate directly into higher fertiliser prices.  
Between 2005 and 2008 the price of fertiliser increased fivefold, rising at an even 
sharper rate than the cost of food (Government Office for Science 2011), which 
inevitably had a consequence for farmers, especially in the South. Dorward and 
Poulton (2008) provide a detailed analysis of the complex repercussions of the rising 
cost of imported fertilisers for maize farmers in Malawi. Here, farm-gate fertiliser 
prices (excluding subsidy) would be amongst the highest in the world due to the cost 
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of transporting low volumes from the coast into this landlocked country and then into 
rural areas. Meanwhile many Malawians spend over 25 percent of their income on 
maize, which is their staple food. Farmers are consequently experiencing a rising 
break-even price due to the rising cost of fertiliser such that they can barely remain 
competitive with imported South African maize. Yet government subsidy to make 
fertiliser purchase more affordable and boost domestic production represents a huge 
drain on the national budget  - in the order of 17 percent of the 2007-08 budget 
according to Dorward and Poulton (2008). Rising energy prices consequently 
translate directly into domestic food production capacity and ultimately into the food 
and nutritional security of farmers and low-income urban dwellers. 
There is growing recognition that conventional oil, that is the light crude which has 
dominated production to date, is close to or may have already passed peak supply 
(Murray and King 2012, Hirsch 2007). This represents the point of maximum output, 
with aggregate global production amounting to nearly 85 million barrels per day 
(Aleklett et al 2010). Even the IMF’s recent World Economic Outlook notes that the 
“persistent increase in oil prices over the past decade suggests that global oil 
markets have entered a period of increased scarcity” and that a return to abundance 
is unlikely in the near term (IMF 2011: 89).  Although there may yet still be, even by 
conservative estimates, another one trillion barrels of conventional oil that could be 
exploited, it is as well to remember that since 1981 we have been using more oil 
than has been found and the gap between discovery and consumption has been 
growing with every passing year (Campbell 2003). In 2007 the world consumed six 
barrels for every one that was discovered. Moreover, many of the remaining known 
reserves are generally located in smaller fields that are more costly to exploit; these 
new fields are increasingly likely to be found offshore where the engineering 
challenges (and the environmental risks) are very much greater. For example, the 
recently discovered Tupi field off the coast of Brazil not only lies below 2 km of ocean 
but a further 4 km below the seabed within a salt field that presents additional 
complications. The difficulties of recovering conventional oil from such deposits has 
made the development of non-conventional sources more attractive and cost 
competitive. One such development has centred upon tar sands in the Province of 
Alberta, Canada, which involves large-scale open-cast mining of bitumen and 
considerable processing to turn this into useable crude oil. The ecological costs of 
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this industry are considerable and have been the subject of widespread criticism 
(Environmental Integrity Project, 2008; Polaris Institute 2010). Yet even under full 
production output is only expected to reach 4.7m barrels/day by 2035 which will 
hardly make up the difference in the rate of decline of conventional oil (Murray and 
King 2012). It is little wonder that, when the net energy returns on such 
developments are so evidently marginal, the search for substitutability has fastened 
upon biofuels as an ideal alternative to liquid petroleum (Dodson et al 2010).  
 
The development of energy sources from biomass, particularly agricultural crops 
such as sugar cane, maize and oil palm – hence McMichael’s preference for the 
term agrofuels to refer to crops that compete for land (McMichael 2009b) – has 
further cemented the interlocking of energy and food security. It can be expected that 
ethanol output will continue to rise sharply given the 30 percent increase in prices 
during 2010 (OECD-FAO 2011). Although there are efforts underway to develop so-
called ‘second generation’ cellulosic biofuels and even third generation using algae 
(Murphy 2010), the short to medium term looks set to remain dominated by sugar 
cane and maize (ethanol) and palm and other vegetable oils (biodiesel). This will be 
reinforced by statutory targets such as the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive that 
requires total transport fuel to comprise 10 percent from renewable sources by 2020. 
Similar targets have been set in the USA and other highly developed and newly 
emerging economies, primarily as a way of off-setting vulnerability to rising oil prices, 
but discursively much is also made of the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
(Buyx and Tait 2011, van der Horst and Vermeylen 2011). 
Overall, there is little doubt that agro-biofuels will continue to significantly impact 
upon food security, particularly as powerful emerging economies scramble to take 
control of land in some of the poorest countries in pursuit of their own food and 
energy security. Some of the largest land leasing and investment proposals have 
featured a high element of biofuels production, for example the attempt by Daewoo, 
the Korean conglomerate, to lease 1.3 m ha in Madagascar (representing 40 percent 
of its arable land) for biofuel and food. The proposal triggered such protests that the 
government of Madagascar fell from office and the incoming president cancelled the 
deal (Cotula et al. 2011). China has apparently acquired 2.8 m ha of land in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo for a biofuel oil palm plantation (von Braun and 
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Meinzen-Dick 2009), yet this in a country where 76 percent of the population is 
regarded as undernourished (Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen 2010). Other land 
deals have been struck by Saudi Arabia, other Gulf States, South Korea and China 
in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique amongst other African states; and with 
Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines and other poor Asian countries.  
It is clear that food price volatility has revealed the extent to which food and energy 
markets have become interlocked, with ‘peak oil’ triggering multiple and far-reaching 
repercussions for the global food system. A food regimes framework demonstrates 
how the food needs of the poor can be subordinated to the energy demands of the 
more powerful and, by recognising the essential fungibility of agri-commodities, is 
better able to explain the rise of biofuels within the wider global political economy. 
That this process is framed by a discourse that positions biofuels as a ‘green’ 
response to the dilemma of rising oil prices is, of course, the ultimate incongruity. 
     
4. Climate change and food security 
It is now generally regarded as unequivocal that rising atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that derive from human activities, 
including food production, are having a discernible influence on the world’s climate 
(IPCC 2007). Ongoing regional scenario-building exercises using general circulation 
and statistical crop models suggest that there will be a growing divergence between 
major world regions in terms of agricultural output, and this will also alter their 
relative ‘comparative advantages’ having a major effect on trade flows. It is believed 
that the mid- to high-latitude regions of the world will benefit from a rise in ground 
level temperatures that will lengthen the growing season, and increased atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 will have an additional fertilisation effect such that rain-fed 
wheat yields in Northern Europe might increase by as much as 30 percent (Keane et 
al. 2009, IPCC 2007). Regions throughout the tropics, on the other hand, are likely to 
experience a significant deterioration in cereal yields in the decades ahead, with 
countries such as Malawi needing to adapt to a possible 20 percent reduction in 
agricultural export earnings because of reduced agricultural output as a result of 
climate change (Keane et al 2009).  
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The main impacts of climate on agricultural production can be identified as will arise 
from the effects of, and interactions between, the following: 
• Higher temperatures putting greater heat stress on crops, animals and 
farmers 
• Changing precipitation patterns that will disrupt established cycles of rain-
fed agriculture and associated livelihood activities; 
• The likely development of new pests and disease that will not only affect 
crops and animals but worsen the existing burden of human ill-health;  
• Increased likelihood of extreme weather events (drought, floods) that not 
only directly impact agricultural production but destroy physical 
infrastructure affecting distribution  
In practice impacts are likely to be exacerbated by the dynamic interactions between 
these individual variables. For example, drought and heat stress are tightly coupled 
as rising temperatures result in increased rates of evapotranspiration which may not 
be met by available soil moisture provided by seasonal rainfall or irrigation. Battisti 
and Naylor (2009) highlight the likely consequences of higher temperatures for an 
already food insecure region such as the Sahel. Crop and livestock production play 
an essential role in the region’s economy, employing around 60 percent of the active 
population. The region experienced prolonged drought (from the late 1960s to the 
early 1990s) which resulted in countless hunger-related deaths, unprecedented rates 
of migration, and the impoverishment of hundreds of thousands of households that 
lost their livestock and other assets. Yet despite rains returning to some parts of the 
Sahel over the past 15 years, maize, millet and sorghum yields remain low; and 
there is limited access to improved varieties, fertilisers, credit or irrigation. Moreover, 
growing season temperatures are not only very high (ranging from 25 C in the south 
to 35 C in the north) but are trending upward such that, by the end of this century – 
and earlier for some parts of the region – they will exceed the hottest seasons 
recorded during the past century. “Such heat will compound food insecurity caused 
by variable rainfall in the region”, argue Battisti and Naylor, with heat stress making 
“the region’s population far more vulnerable to poverty and hunger-related deaths 
and will likely drive many people out of agriculture altogether, thus expanding 
migrant and refugee populations” (2009: 243). 
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Mapping the effects of climate change on food insecurity throughout the tropics is 
work currently being undertaken by a CGIAR programme. Looking to identify 
‘hotspot’ locations of food insecurity arising from climate change required the 
application of a number of more sensitive indicators than average season growing 
temperatures. Using predictive data of temperature and precipitation up to 2050 from 
a number of global climate models, a series of derived indicators were developed 
and applied to a broad belt of the Earth between 35 degrees South and 45 degrees 
North. Some of the key conclusions include: 
• The length of growing period flips to less than 120 days in a number of 
locations across the tropics including Mexico, northeast Brazil, Southern and 
West Africa and India. This is a critical threshold for a number of crops as well 
as rangeland vegetation.  
• Reliable crop growing days decrease to critical levels below which cropping 
might become too risky to pursue as a major livelihood strategy in a large 
number of places across the global tropics, including West Africa, East Africa, 
and the Indo-Gangetic Plains 
• High temperature stress (above 30°C) will be widespread in East and 
Southern Africa, north and south India, Southeast Asia, northern Latin 
America and Central America 
• Changes in rainfall quantity and quality which are likely to make rainfed 
agriculture riskier in many parts of the tropics. Such changes include: 
increased variability in timing; reduced rainfall per rain event; and increased 
rainfall intensity leading to increased runoff and erosion. (Ericksen et al 2011) 
 
Ultimately, this work must combine these threshold indicators with an understanding 
of the contemporary food security status of regions to begin to map their vulnerability 
to climate change. For as Devereux and Edwards (2004: 24) note: “if the households 
and countries that stand to lose food production due to climate change are also 
those that depend most on agriculture and have fewest alternative sources of 
income, then falling harvests will certainly undermine household and national food 
security”. In other words, the biggest losers from climate change are likely to be 
people who will be most exposed to the worst of its impacts and are the least able to 
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cope. In which case we must ask: how will the global food system respond to the 
increasing vulnerability of millions of poor people? 
Although food security is about access to food and not determined solely by self-
sufficient production, it is unlikely that sufficient food could be imported from 
temperate zone countries regarded as potential medium-term beneficiaries from 
global warming to balance the food deficit of the tropics. This is because the 
expected decline in agricultural GDP and in purchasing power, coupled with the 
continuing rise in global food prices, will simply make commercial purchases of 
cereals on world markets unaffordable for many of the poorest countries (Hoffman 
2011). Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how food aid can grow to fill this gap: 
currently the UN World Food programme struggles to feed fewer than 10 percent of 
the world’s malnourished. In this regard, food security needs to be understood, not 
as an inevitable and immutable outcome of biophysical changes in climate, but as a 
reflection of social, economic, institutional and technological responses (and non-
responses). It is, above all, about grappling with an entire nexus of inter-related 
issues concerning hunger, poverty, social and economic inequalities, health and 
nutrition, climate change and resource depletion. Approaching these issues 
collectively quickly reveals that productivist, high external-input agriculture producing 
for distant markets is less likely to resolve the essential vulnerability of food insecure 
populations. Rather, it is about designing food production capabilities that enhance 
resilience, can foster adaptation to changing circumstances and contribute to 
mitigation. 
In their ground-breaking report, the IAASTD (2009) usefully distinguishes between 
two kinds of adaptation: autonomous and planned. Autonomous adaptations are 
triggered by ecological, economic or welfare changes and involves the 
implementation of existing knowledge and technology in response. They are 
therefore largely an extension of existing risk-management activities and include 
changes to cropping patterns (using new crop species or varieties), water 
management practices and perhaps the diversification of agricultural and household 
activities. Planned adaptations, in contrast, represent a more deliberate set of 
decisions that recognises that change is underway and action is required to maintain 
or achieve a desired state. Such a response may be about increasing adaptive 
capacity, perhaps by investment in critical infrastructure or by the development of 
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new knowledge and management practices tailored to anticipated changes in 
climate. A concerted effort at international level to challenge the productivist model of 
agriculture and to build support for a multi-functional model of sustainable 
intensification is a vital first step in planned adaptation. Working with national 
governments and regional bodies to develop agri-food systems that are more 
resilient, equitable and sustainable; that deliver outputs that contribute to local food 
security and which create synergies with other policy domains (health, nutrition, 
employment) offers a genuine alternative to a neo-liberal agricultural model failing to 
feed the global population in a warming world.  
Ultimately, however, the extent of the challenge presented by climate change for 
food security will largely rest upon the ability of the global community to engage in a 
collective emissions reduction strategy that will ensure that we keep to a minimum 
any breach of the 2 degree increase threshold in global mean temperatures that 
might trigger mega-catastrophes (Kousky et al 2009). In this respect given the 
contribution of food supply to greenhouse gas emissions particularly in the wealthiest 
parts of the world – for example a European study found that food accounts for 31 
percent of the global warming potential of all goods and services in the EU-25 
(Tukker et al 2006) – then efforts to reduce these impacts would appear essential.  
This means that we must address not only how we produce and distribute our food, 
but also what it is we eat (Garnett 2011). Making changes in patterns of consumption 
might also improve health and wellbeing in many diverse populations.      
 
5. The nutrition transition and malconsumption  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s food security was principally concerned with basic 
foodstuffs, such as cereals and tubers, to resolve problems of protein-energy 
malnutrition. This began to change by the late 1980s when health and nutrition 
research findings, first, began to demonstrate the role of disease in preventing the 
effective utilisation of food; and, secondly, highlighted the significance of micro-
nutrient deficiencies in poor health. Today, although one billion people remain 
malnourished with insufficient protein and energy intake to sustain a healthy active 
life, a larger number experience a different form of malconsumption, resulting in 
excess intake of calories that contribute to overweight and obesity. Indeed, the 
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paradox of this phenomenon of obesity is that it is becoming much less a feature of 
the wealthy who can afford to indulge in over-consumption but more a burden of the 
poor across the world. 
Changing patterns of body composition largely reflects changing diets with energy-
dense, nutrient-poor ‘pseudo foods’ (Winson 2004), comprising high levels of 
vegetables oils, animal fats, sugar and salt, becoming a ubiquitous feature of the 
global food system. The prevalence of diets characterised by such foods has been 
labelled the ‘nutrition transition’ (Popkin 2005), a process whereby long-established 
dietary patterns and culinary traditions dominated by regional staples (grains or 
tubers) are replaced by ‘Western’-style highly processed products (Pingali 2006). 
This shift from starchy staples to more fatty foods as people’s incomes rise is known 
as Bennett’s Law (Godfray et al 2010). There are a number of factors underpinning 
this change particularly within the newly emerging economies of the South: 
increased urbanisation; increased household income; greater market penetration by 
foreign brands, global supermarket and food service chains; the expansion of 
advertising and mass media; and highly competitive prices.   
Although there is an emerging critical geography of corpulence that rejects the 
discursive construction and scientific legitimation of the ‘obesity epidemic’ (Colls and 
Evans 2009, Guthman 2009), this does not detract from recognising the ways spatial 
injustice is reflected in access to food and health. Nor does it challenge the causal 
evidence that links obesity with adult-onset diabetes that is directly responsible for a 
host of health problems including heart disease, kidney failure and the loss of 
eyesight and limbs. Today the country with the largest number of diabetic patients is 
India (Popkin 2010).  
Such developments demonstrate the contemporary dialectics of poverty which result 
from the control of the global food system by powerful corporate interests. Adopting 
a food regimes approach themselves, Campbell and Dixon (2009) remind us that 
underpinning the ordering and re-ordering of the global food economy is the 
essential fact that populations sell their labour power for food. As commoditization 
and neo-liberalism proceed, bringing all into the ambit of the global marketplace 
judged by the principle of comparative advantage, it is hardly surprising that an 
increasing proportion of rural dwellers are net purchasers of food. And where small 
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farmer agriculture is continuously undercut by low price imported staples produced 
under greater economies of scale elsewhere (and often supported by a raft of hidden 
subsidies), then re-orienting production to export markets becomes one of the last 
remaining acts of survival before ecological and economic pressures overwhelm. 
Hence, the rise of high-value food exports from South to North while consumption is 
met by low price energy dense processed foods.  This food regimes perspective 
consequently reveals how achieving food security, once largely considered a 
responsibility of nation-states on behalf of its citizens, is replaced by acceptance that 
this is now a service performed by transnational agri-food corporations on behalf of 
consumers – urban and rural, in the South and North - worldwide.     
In a highly revealing paper Hawkes (2006) illustrates how globalisation and trade 
liberalisation, involving investments by transnational food corporations into countries 
of the South, have transformed dietary patterns. She does so by underlining the 
context dependence of global processes so that there might be many different 
outcomes for people whether urban or rural, the poor compared to the rich, and their 
relative risk from under-nutrition or over-nutrition. In this regard she distinguishes 
between ‘dietary convergence’ and ‘dietary adaptation’, with both part and parcel of 
the nutrition transition. Evidence suggests that as countries become more integrated 
into the world economy dietary patterns converge with “increased consumption of 
meat and meat products, dairy products, edible oil, salt and sugar, and a lower 
intake of dietary fibre”(p.3). Dietary adaptation, on the other hand, is “increased 
consumption of brand-name processed and store-bought food, an increased number 
of meals eaten outside the home and consumer behaviours driven by the appeal of 
new foods”, reflecting increased exposure to advertising and the emergence of new 
food retail outlets (Hawkes 2006: 3). Although Hawkes demonstrates that these two 
dynamic and competitive forces of convergence and adaptation create more 
complex outcomes than often represented by the ‘Coca-Colonization’ hypothesis, 
these dietary transitions are, nevertheless, associated with 
“rising rates of overweight, obesity and diet-related chronic diseases, like heart 
disease, diabetes and some cancers. More people now die of heart disease in 
developing countries than in developed, and the problem is becoming more 
serious among the poor. Low quality diets are also associated with 
undernutrition in the form of micronutrient deficiency, which, in turn, lowers 
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immunity to infectious diseases. Poor diet quality is thus associated with a dual 
burden of malnutrition and disease” (Hawkes 2006: 2).  
Hawkes goes on to illustrate how foreign direct investment in the manufacture and 
retail of processed foods is changing consumption patterns in a country such as 
Mexico. Mexico is indeed an excellent example of how agri-food corporations can 
transform an entire society once political agreements have removed any obstacles to 
their free operation. Patel (2007) notes the significance of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement signed in 1994 and the impact this was always likely to have on 
Mexico’s maize (corn) market as cheap US imports undercut campesino production. 
Yet while maize prices fell 50 percent between 1990 and 2003, tortilla prices tripled 
during the 1990s and doubled again during 2006, so that those on low incomes were 
forced into less-nutritious alternatives such as white bread and noodles (McMichael 
2009b).  Tortilla prices, it should be noted, have been significantly affected by the 
high level of market concentration enjoyed by the major grain traders (such as ADM 
and Cargill) that also have strong interests in biofuels and meat production. As 
increasing amounts of yellow maize were diverted to ethanol distilleries, the supply 
of white maize - regarded by Mexicans as superior for its eating properties - was 
removed from the tortilla chain to provide the substitute cattle feed (Holt-Gimenez 
and Patel 2009).   
Yet while this traditional food staple was becoming ever more expensive, sales of 
processed foods have grown quickly with particularly rapid expansion in the snack 
food, baked goods, dairy products and soft drink categories. For example, 
consumption of Coca-Cola drinks rose from 275 servings per person per year in 
1992 to 487 in 2002 (a level greater than in the United States). Even in rural areas, 
according to Hawkes, “it is typical for children to buy soft drinks and snacks everyday 
in school breaks. Higher consumption of these energy-dense foods ...has been 
linked with obesity and diet-related chronic diseases” (Hawkes 2006: 7/18). Indeed, 
a recently published on-line report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, Oliver De Schutter, reveals just how seriously the Mexican dietary 
health situation has become. The report notes that: 
• With regard to food insecurity progress has been uneven and deprivation levels 
in enjoyment of the right to food remain dramatic for a large part of the 
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population. Some 19.5 m people lived in food poverty in 2008, up from 14.4 m in 
2006. 
• The “state of emergency” that Mexico is facing with regard to overweight and 
obesity. It notes: “35 m adults - 7 out of 10 - are overweight or obese: these 
people will experience sickness, on average, for 18.5 years during their lifetime. 
Overweight and obesity are increasing at all income levels, although fastest 
within the lowest quintile... “ It has been calculated that type II diabetes, cancer 
and cardiovascular diseases cost Mexico 67 billion pesos (US$4.9 billion) in 
medical care and in premature deaths in 2008, and by 2017 these direct costs 
will rise to 78 billion pesos (US$5.6 billion).  
• Although a National Agreement for Nutritional Health was reached in January 
2010 it remains a blunt tool for changing consumer behaviour. As a result, “for 
many Mexicans, particularly in urban areas or in the northern states, switching to 
healthier diets is becoming increasingly difficult. The trade policies currently in 
place favour an increased reliance on heavily processed and refined foods, with a 
long shelf life, which does not favour the consumption of fresh and more 
perishable foods, particularly fruits and vegetables” (De Schutter 2011b).  
This account of the deteriorating nutritional status of the Mexican people is occurring, 
it should be noted, in a country that possesses a distinctive and internationally 
regarded food culture and culinary tradition, as well as providing the world’s genetic 
reservoir for maize. It demonstrates why it is necessary to reformulate prevailing 
conceptions of food security in order to permit a theoretically-grounded framework 
capable of accommodating multiple levels of analysis. A food regimes approach has 
the capability of doing this, linking material transformations such as distortions in 
dietary practices that compromise health and wellbeing to changing transnational 
trade rules that serve to facilitate corporate penetration of domestic markets. In 
short, food regimes analysis locates the nutrition transition –and malconsumption - 
within an understanding of power relations (Dixon 2009).  
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6. Conclusions 
This paper has highlighted three dimensions of vulnerability confronting the global 
food system: the interlocking of food and energy markets, the threat of climate 
change and the problem of malconsumption arising from the nutrition transition. 
Energy security and climate change have been labelled the ‘yin and yang’ of high 
energy society: scarcity and abundance that are connected through a shared 
relationship to a carbon-intensive mode of existence (Bridge 2010). Moreover, both 
share characteristics of post-normal science, where facts are uncertain, stakes are 
high and decisions urgent (Friedrichs 2011).  Arguably, their point of intersection is 
most acute in relation to the changing dynamics of the global food system, which 
itself encapsulates this carbon intensity, and it is certain they will act singly and in 
tandem to cause further volatility in food prices.  
The third element, changing consumption practices - primarily although, of course, 
not confined to - the South highlighted how the nutrition transition is affecting dietary 
health. However, it is also linked to climate change given that it invariably includes 
increased consumption of meat products which have higher greenhouse gas 
intensity than do other food products (Garnett 2009).  
In this regard Lang (2010) is correct to call for a new era of food policies that build 
upon recognised environmental limits (the ‘New Fundamentals’) to deliver low 
carbon, nutritious and sustainable food. This will require a thorough revision of 
understandings of food security that go beyond the conventional framing of access, 
availability and affordability, to include an expanded appreciation factoring in all diet-
related ill health, not just hunger. Other desirable aspirations for food and agricultural 
policy include finding ways of meshing embedded carbon, water and land use into 
common standards by which to judge food, rather than using the price signal alone; 
and this, in turn, will require significant effort to recalibrate consumer aspirations 
engaging them in lowering food’s impact on the environment (Lang 2010).  Yet, while 
we need policy measures at all levels – from local to global – that work 
synergistically to feed everyone - sustainably, equitably and healthily – the food 
system remains dominated by powerful economic interests that the institutions of 
global public policy seem unwilling or unable to regulate (see Hawkes and Buse 
2011). 
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In this regard, the food regimes approach has a useful role to play in demonstrating 
that the pursuit of neoliberalism in food and agriculture worldwide over the past thirty 
years – irrespective of whether it constitutes a third regime - has left a terrible legacy 
of environmental damage, resource depletion, one billion under-nourished and more 
than one billion over-nourished and overweight. For this reason, we need further 
research that is less preoccupied with the development of new technologies to feed 
nine billion people in 2050, but more concerned with revealing the interconnections 
between a hegemonic agri-food system, the degradation of environmental support 
systems and stressed human metabolic states. Only then will we be able to devise 
effective global governance capable of resolving the problems of food insecurity and 
malconsumption in a warming world.   
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